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The US pandemic influenza 
implementation plan at six months
Stephen S Morse
There has been great concern recently about 
pandemic influenza. The US government 
developed a National Strategy for Pandemic 
Influenza in November 2005, followed by 
an implementation plan in May 2006. A six-
month progress report was published in late 
December. The current strategies are intended 
to improve preparedness and response for the 
next influenza pandemic. In comparison with 
the optimistic neglect that often characterized 
past planning for pandemic influenza, there 
has been considerable progress on a number 
of fronts in the past year. Despite this prog-
ress, major gaps remain. These include the 
coordination, encouragement and funding of 
international surveillance and cooperation; the 
need for new and more agile vaccine technolo-
gies; limitations in the use and distribution of 
antiviral agents; and communication with, and 
resources for, local responders and the public. 
One question is why, despite an estimated 
36,000 seasonal influenza deaths annually in 
the United States alone, and a much greater 
number during pandemics, relatively little new 
basic research has been done for decades. This 
emphasizes both the need for and the difficulty 
of sustaining pandemic preparedness.
There is good reason to be concerned about 
a future influenza pandemic. There were three 
in the twentieth century, in 1918–1919, 1957 
and 1968, and most virologists believe that 
pandemics are inevitable1. The greatest influ-
enza pandemic, in 1918–1919, was also the 
worst natural disaster in recorded history, with 
an estimate of over 50 million deaths world-
wide2–4. Concern about the state of pandemic 
preparedness and response has been increas-
ing over the last decade. In 1999, when the 
World Health Organization (WHO) produced 
pandemic planning recommendations, only 
Canada and the UK already had plans. By 2007, 
29 countries had submitted plans (available 
at http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_
influenza/links/en/index.html) to WHO.
Next year will mark the 90th anniversary of 
the great pandemic of 1918, making it espe-
cially timely to take stock of our readiness for 
the next pandemic. On 1 November 2005, the 
President of the United States declared that 
“nature has presented us with a daunting chal-
lenge: the possibility of an influenza pandemic,” 
and announced the government’s National 
Strategy for Pandemic Influenza (http://www.
pandemicflu.gov, under Federal Planning). 
This strategy is intended to address the next 
influenza pandemic, whichever influenza 
virus is the cause. Although we do not know 
whether the H5N1 avian influenza strain will 
ever develop the ability to spread readily from 
person to person and thus become pandemic, 
this virus has recently been getting close scru-
tiny. It has already caused serious human illness 
and deaths, primarily although not exclusively 
through close contact with infected poultry. 
There have also been tremendous economic 
losses for poultry farmers.
The US pandemic plan and progress in 
implementation
The national strategy delineated three critical 
goals, or ‘pillars’: “to detect and contain out-
breaks before they spread across the world, to 
protect the American people by stockpiling 
vaccines and antiviral drugs and accelerating 
the development of new vaccine technolo-
gies, and to ensure that Federal, State and 
local communities are prepared for potential 
domestic outbreaks.” The national strategy was 
followed in May 2006 by the National Strategy 
Implementation Plan (http://www.pandemic
flu.gov, under Federal Planning), which enu-
merated a timeline for specific actions to be 
taken across the Federal government. The 
implementation plan also required reports 
on progress toward these specific tasks. The 
six-month progress report, National Strategy 
for Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan: 
Summary of Progress (http://www.pandemicflu.
gov, under Federal Planning), was released 
on 29 December 2006. The purpose of this 
Commentary is to evaluate progress thus far 
and to discuss further needs.
International surveillance and cooperation, 
crucial for dealing with global diseases, is the 
first pillar of the plan. In the past, international 
public health was often neglected and under-
funded. The US government is contributing to 
international virus surveillance through WHO, 
providing funding and technical assistance. The 
high-level political backing and visibility of the 
current effort may also have helped to galvanize 
other actions. A number of countries have now 
developed pandemic plans. Meetings, such as 
the US government–initiated International 
Partnership on Avian and Pandemic Influenza, 
have been convened for international fund-
raising. Almost $2.4 billion has reportedly 
been raised through other donor conferences 
jointly sponsored by the United Nations and 
the World Bank. Over $300 million of this 
was disbursed by the end of 2006 (http://
siteresources.worldbank.org/INTTOPAVIFLU/
Resources/Framework06-2006.pdf), although 
it remains to be seen what total amounts are 
ultimately disbursed and how the funds are 
used. The funding is intended to be used for a 
variety of purposes, including compensation 
to farmers whose poultry flocks need to be 
culled, as well as support of public health and 
medical needs. Given the current situation with 
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H5N1 as an avian disease, control in poultry 
is an essential measure and requires adequate 
compensation for farmers.
Closely tied to this is diagnostic capacity. 
There are several promising technologies for 
multiagent identification, including PCR, dip-
sticks and array-based devices. However, any 
diagnostic test must be inexpensive, easy to use 
and relatively accurate if it is to be used in field 
settings, especially in developing countries, 
and it must reliably identify and differentiate a 
new strain (which may be yet another influenza 
virus in addition to H5N1) from the circulating 
seasonal influenza subtypes. The Department 
of Health and Human Services (HHS) and HHS 
components, including the National Institutes 
of Health’s National Institute of Allergy and 
Infectious Diseases (NIH/NIAID) and the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC), have financed several efforts in diag-
nostic development, and they are anticipating 
commercial products in about 2–3 years.
The second leg of the plan includes vac-
cines and antiviral agents. For over 50 years, 
the mainstay of our defense against influenza 
has been vaccine1,5. Manufacturers (seem-
ingly fewer in number each year) produce 
new influenza vaccines annually, a process 
that must start months before the ‘flu sea-
son’. Producing influenza vaccine in eggs was 
a major breakthrough. However, it is dif-
ficult to switch production on short notice. 
A major limitation is the supply of suitable 
fertilized eggs. The plan assumes that new 
vaccine production would require about six 
months, a realistic assessment under current 
conditions. To facilitate rapid production, the 
government is providing funding for vaccines 
in which the influenza viruses are grown in cell 
culture instead of in eggs. Viruses grown in cell 
culture have been used to make many other 
viral vaccines for decades, leading one to won-
der why cell culture vaccines could not have 
been introduced years ago. The most recent 
vaccine innovation in the last decade has been 
the introduction of live attenuated influenza 
vaccines (FluMist). The production process is 
similar to conventional influenza vaccines, in 
eggs or cell culture, but the final product con-
sists of live attenuated viruses, administered as 
a nasal spray. In vaccine development, liability 
has historically been another major concern 
for manufacturers6. The Public Readiness and 
Emergency Preparedness (PREP) Act, passed 
by Congress last year, is intended to address 
this problem.
A second part of this pillar is acquisition 
and stockpiling of antiviral drugs. Effort has 
focused on the neuraminidase inhibitors, the 
main class of antiviral agents that has shown 
therapeutic efficacy against influenza7. Much of 
the attention has revolved around oseltamivir 
(Tamiflu), because it can be administered orally 
and is active systemically. In order to diversify 
the stockpile, the US government is including 
a second neuraminidase inhibitor, zanamivir 
(Relenza), expected to comprise 20% of the 
stockpile. This is an ongoing program, and it 
continues to evolve. However, as of this writing, 
the current federal goal is 75 million treatment 
courses, sufficient quantities (by government 
estimates) to treat all of the US population who 
are anticipated to become ill and are likely to 
benefit from antiviral treatment. This com-
prises 25% of the US population. Of the 75 
million drug courses, states have the option 
to purchase 31 million using state funds, at a 
20% federal subsidy. This has led to varying 
decisions by states on how much they wish to 
buy (or can afford). Assuming sufficient supply 
continues, adding prophylactic use, such as for 
patients’ families and healthcare workers, has 
been suggested. Targeted antiviral prophylaxis 
in schools and other high-transmission set-
tings has also been advocated as a strategy for 
reducing transmission8. Finally, another 6 mil-
lion courses in the national stockpile are held 
for targeted containment of identified early 
outbreaks anywhere in the world. Perhaps to 
hedge bets in view of limited supplies and the 
expected development of viral resistance, in 
January HHS awarded a $102.6 million con-
tract to BioCryst Pharmaceuticals for advanced 
development of their injectable neuraminidase 
inhibitor, peramivir.
The third pillar of the strategy is domestic 
preparedness. Over the last year, HHS Secretary 
Leavitt has met with government officials in 
every state and territory throughout the United 
States. These state summits have been an 
impressive effort to engage municipalities and 
state authorities. Many municipalities believe, 
however, that despite federal aid they still do 
not have sufficient resources to support local 
preparedness. They are especially concerned 
about the need to have the resources and 
medical surge capacity. Supporting and build-
ing local capacity, and coordinating different 
jurisdictions, is probably the greatest single 
operational issue within the United States.
Gaps and future needs
Influenza seems to be getting serious considera-
tion at last. Having a coherent national strategy 
is itself significant. Though a number of the 
activities listed in the implementation plan, 
such as interagency meetings, are administra-
tive, there are many broader accomplishments 
as well. The plan is ambitious and represents 
the most comprehensive attempt at pandemic 
preparedness so far. It recognizes the interde-
pendency of systems and communities, and 
the need for flexibility. Flexibility is essential, 
as influenza pandemics have been unpredict-
able, each one unique1.
Many alliances have also been developed at 
the international level; these need continual 
reinforcement. However, many of these laud-
able international efforts remain largely ad hoc. 
Although the US progress report discusses a 
mandate and new systems for international 
surveillance, there is insufficient detail to 
judge their effectiveness. Will the system be 
a single network or (as seems more likely) a 
‘network of networks’? If the latter, will the 
systems all be able to share information read-
ily using common standards (in the current 
jargon, will they be interoperable)? For that 
matter, how will human health and veterinary 
systems be linked, if at all? The gaps between 
animal and human health systems remain 
dangerously wide. The training of veterinar-
ians to recognize and control influenza in fowl 
and to understand its natural history, cross-
training between human and animal health 
personnel, and information sharing should 
be greatly accelerated and improved. Recent 
initiatives have improved information sharing 
for influenza surveillance, at least at the official 
level, but need to be strengthened and greatly 
expanded.
A workable real-time global system of out-
break reporting and response has long been 
a ‘holy grail’ for those working on emerging 
infectious diseases9. Systems being developed 
for pandemic influenza surveillance could 
form the foundation of a generic system that 
can also be applied to unanticipated future 
threats. These systems should also support 
the new International Health Regulations 
(http://www.who.int/csr/ihr/en/), which are 
scheduled to begin implementation in June 
2007, and which mandate rapid, and preferably 
electronic, international disease reporting. 
This will require considerable funding, as well 
as other incentives.
Effective diagnostics are essential, but diag-
nostic capacity still remains a shortcoming. 
Time lags in diagnosis and reporting can still 
be considerable, exacerbated by a lack of fast, 
reliable and inexpensive point-of-care or field 
diagnostics. The consequences can be enor-
mous, especially if one hopes to quell a pan-
demic by treating and isolating the first clusters 
of human cases, which are likely to be outside 
the United States or western Europe10,11. 
Rapid response requires rapid recognition. 
An extreme example of delayed recognition 
was a human H5N1 death in 2003 that was 
not reported until almost three years later12. 
More typically, based on WHO reports exam-
ined by the author, laboratory confirmation 
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about a week (although sometimes less) after 
the case is recognized by health authorities, 
but it often took two weeks to a month. Even 
a week could allow a pandemic virus to gener-
ate a number of new, possibly dispersed, cases 
before a response is initiated. Another recent 
concern was Indonesia’s decision against shar-
ing new H5N1 isolates. Although this issue now 
appears settled, the incident served to highlight 
the inequities in the distribution of vaccine and 
access to care that a number of developing 
countries fear will occur in a pandemic. The 
incident also demonstrates how dependent we 
all are on availability of isolates and sequence 
data, which will often come from developing 
countries, and emphasizes the importance of 
global capacity building and resource sharing 
in the face of a truly global disease problem.
For a number of years, limited vaccine 
capacity and disequilibrium between supply 
and demand have been serious concerns. Ways 
to stabilize demand (such as by government-
guaranteed minimum purchases) are essential. 
So is a concerted strategy for bringing more 
rapid vaccine production online. Current vac-
cine capacity is sorely limited, and manufac-
ture is slow in comparison with the speed with 
which a pandemic influenza strain can tra-
verse the globe. Additional technologies must 
be encouraged and tested. The long timeline 
and high cost of new vaccine development are 
themselves worrisome, if we are to have ade-
quate vaccine capacity for pandemics.
There is currently little incentive to develop 
new vaccine technologies and bring them to 
market. One collateral benefit of the attention 
to pandemic influenza may be to encourage 
consideration of new strategies, as in the use 
of a new adjuvant in a human H5N1 vaccine 
candidate. The most widely used human influ-
enza vaccines contain the hemagglutinin (and 
sometimes also the neuraminidase) surface 
proteins extracted from virus that has been 
grown and then inactivated—basically, one 
purified protein each from the three current 
strains believed most likely to cause the major 
seasonal epidemics in the coming year. If the 
object is to produce a protein, why not simply 
clone the desired viral hemagglutinin proteins 
and produce them in suitable eukaryotic cell 
culture systems? As early as 2001, Treanor et 
al. tested a recombinant vaccine containing 
the H5 hemagglutinin13. Human antibody 
response was modest but, in retrospect, results 
seem similar to the results reported for the first 
conventional H5 vaccine recently produced by 
Sanofi14. This approach therefore merits revis-
iting, especially in combination with newer 
adjuvants. Kilbourne has suggested produc-
ing inactivated vaccines against all 16 known 
hemagglutinin types, as a ‘universal’ vaccine1. 
Many other experimental approaches for new 
vaccine and therapeutic technologies are also 
in the research stages, many of them funded 
by HHS, NIH/NIAID or CDC5,15–18. However, 
even if some of these are successful, it is likely 
to be a decade or more before they reach the 
clinic. Of equally grave concern, HHS had 
solicited proposals for new vaccine develop-
ment in 2005 and did not judge any of the new 
proposals mature enough to warrant funding. 
HHS plans to reissue this solicitation in 2007; 
it is to be hoped that the results will be more 
promising.
Until a vaccine is produced, which may well 
be 4–6 months, we will need to rely on stocks 
of antiviral agents such as the neuramini-
dase inhibitors; and on nonpharmaceutical 
measures such as staying home when sick, 
possibly closing schools and mass gatherings 
(collectively known as ‘social distancing’), and 
‘respiratory etiquette’ (covering coughs and 
sneezes)19. One difficulty with oseltamivir and 
other neuraminidase inhibitors is that, public 
perceptions to the contrary, we still are learn-
ing how to use these drugs most effectively. 
A related problem is our limited armamenta-
rium of antivirals. At present the most effective 
therapeutic agents for influenza are the neura-
minidase inhibitors. Although most influenza 
viruses remain susceptible, there have already 
been reports of resistance to oseltamivir in a 
few human cases of H5N1 avian influenza. 
Advanced strategies (such as interfering RNAs) 
are in the research stages, but these are likely to 
be years away. Thus new antiviral drugs, such 
as protease inhibitors, that can capitalize on 
known successes with other viruses to allow 
relatively rapid development should also be 
encouraged.
Regarding nonpharmaceutical measures, 
interim Federal guidance from the CDC was 
released in early 2007, and it is still evolving. 
Unfortunately, the science base is less than 
robust19. CDC has funded several projects to 
develop better evidence on effectiveness of 
various interventions. This is welcome, and 
long overdue. Additional research is needed to 
develop a firmer scientific foundation, even for 
such fundamental questions as primary modes 
of transmission.
It appears that determining who is in 
charge among the various federal agencies, 
long a stumbling block, is being resolved. In 
December, Congress passed the Pandemic 
and All-Hazards Preparedness Act (PAHPA, 
Public Law 109-417), which states that HHS 
is now the lead federal agency for response to 
public health emergencies. The act also estab-
lishes the Biomedical Advanced Research and 
Development Authority (BARDA) within 
HHS, which could help to accelerate advanced 
development of new vaccines and antivirals. 
However, it is too soon to determine the effect 
of this law. The bill also requires HHS to set 
preparedness standards for states. Interestingly, 
it also requires HHS to establish within two 
years a nationwide electronic information-
sharing system to enhance detection of and 
response to disease outbreaks and other public 
health emergencies, although (as of this writ-
ing) additional funds have not yet been allo-
cated for this purpose. A national or, better, 
international integrated surveillance system 
would be an enormous step forward.
Much of the actual execution of any plan 
will need to occur at the local level, and there 
is considerable variation in local capacity and 
plans for mass distribution of antivirals and 
vaccine. Continued development of standard 
procedures, and local and regional exercises, 
are essential. Local implementation of non-
pharmaceutical countermeasures may also be a 
concern. Therefore, strengthening local public 
health remains a high priority. Many consider 
this area to be insufficiently funded. As D.A. 
Henderson and colleagues have noted, it is 
essential to inform the public and involve the 
community in planning20. Community plan-
ning to ensure sufficient hospital capacity and 
medical care is essential.
One of the strongest lessons, as we consider 
1918, is that despite considerable progress in 
the last century, much of the basic science is 
still simply lacking19,21. Fundamental ques-
tions of environmental stability, reasons for 
seasonality and many other properties remain 
largely unanswered. We lack the ability to pre-
dict transmissibility across species or from 
human to human. Much of what we know 
about influenza is based on limited inferential 
evidence, often developed decades ago. Thus 
there is an urgent need to develop an integrated 
research agenda that includes special attention 
to the basic science and epidemiology, as well 
as to accelerate applied research such as vaccine 
and diagnostic technologies.
Perhaps most important of all is sustainabil-
ity. For pandemic preparedness, we have only a 
few historical examples to rely on and limited 
data from which to draw4,10,19. If, as we hope, 
the pandemic does not come within the next 
year or two, how can we maintain momen-
tum and encourage funding for public health 
efforts? One essential step is public outreach. 
There has been a great deal of attention in the 
media; this has served mostly to raise aware-
ness. The public will eventually lose interest 
in an imminent threat that does not immedi-
ately materialize. Past history suggests that it is 
possible to sustain some momentum by more 
directly involving the public. In this respect, the 
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Even though we may take it for granted, ‘ordi-
nary’ seasonal flu kills about 36,000 Americans 
annually (by CDC estimates). It provides an 
excellent target and practice opportunity for 
both clinicians and the public.
Recent past emergencies, such as the response 
to Hurricane Katrina, indicate that there is an 
urgent need to think through the desired out-
comes and prepare long before the event. A 
pandemic may be an emergency comparable 
to a Katrina, yet far more widespread and 
protracted. Evacuating people to ‘safe’ ground 
will not be an option. Pandemics may come in 
prolonged and often unpredictable waves that 
will put great stress on our medical systems 
and general infrastructure. Great progress has 
been made, but a great deal remains to be done 
before the next pandemic strikes.
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